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ABSTRACT
The September 11th terrorist attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 people.
Immediately following the attacks, Americans rose to the challenge and willingly
ceded some of their civil liberties to in order to strengthen national security.
However, after Edward Snowden disclosed the National Security Agency’s rampant
bulk collection of metadata from U.S. citizens in 2013, concern about privacy
returned to the forefront of conversation. The government contended that this was a
necessary program that yielded positive results. However, the only case in which the
bulk collection of metadata had successfully thwarted a terrorist plot was in the case
of Moalin, a Somali man living in Southern California who sent money to al-Shabaab.
To much surprise, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the bulk collection of metadata
exceeded the scope of Congress’ authorization under FISA. The Ninth Circuit held
that the government is required to notify defendants that electronic surveillance
occurred, and that the government intends to use the obtained information at trial,
allowing defendants to file a motion challenging its admission. Despite creating this
test, the Ninth Circuit refrained from applying it to Moalin’s case. It remains to be
seen if this decision is emblematic of the turning tides in privacy law in the twenty
years following the September 11th attacks, or if this decision remains the outlier
and the one success story of the government’s bulk metadata collection program.
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THIS IS FISA CALLING TO LET YOU KNOW YOU MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS: NEW NOTICE REQUIREMENT FROM
UNITED STATES V. MOALIN
JENNIFER E. ARMSTRONG
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11th, 2001, the United States suffered the worst terrorist attack
it had ever experienced on U.S. soil. 1 Nearly 3,000 people lost their lives in this
coordinated attack that fundamentally changed the way Americans view national
security.2 In the aftermath of September 11th, the United States Government had to
prove to Americans that they would be safe in their homeland and that the government
would not fail them again.
In furtherance of this objective, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, 3
which expanded many capabilities of the United States Government, including the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA court”).4 Congress originally created
the FISA court in 1978 in order to create a system where the executive branch could
obtain authorization for surveillance on foreign actors.5 The FISA court operates in a
necessary layer of secrecy that often does not allow for non-governmental lawyers to
be party to the hearings.6 This secrecy is a necessary component of building cases
against foreign threats to the United States, principally terrorists. 7
Twelve years after the September 11th terrorist attacks, The Guardian
published a series of articles8 about the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) practice of
bulk collection of metadata with documents supplied by former NSA employee, Edward


© Jennifer Armstrong 2021. J.D. Candidate, UIC John Marshall Law School (2022). B.A. in
International Relations, Boston University (2018). I would like to thank my editors and my family for
all of their support and guidance. No one accomplishes anything alone.
1 Steven
Brill,
Is
America
Any
Safer?,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/.
2 Id.
3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
4 REBECCA WOODS ET AL., DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW § 6.46 (2020).
5 Id.
6 Id. (The primary purpose of the FISA court is to review warrant applications from the Attorney
General regarding the electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.).
7 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Rep. on the Tel. Records Program Conducted
Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance
Court
13
(Jan.
23,
2014),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PCLOBReport.pdf [hereinafter Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board].
8 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order. (This article was the first in a series of articles run by The Guardian based off of
information given to them by Edward Snowden.).
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Snowden.9 Metadata is information, “includ[ing] comprehensive communications
routing information, including . . . identifying information (e.g., originating and
terminating telephone number, communications device identifier, etc.) trunk
identifier, and time and duration of call.”10 This release sparked a series of
controversies over the legality of the NSA’s metadata collection program and other
mass data collection programs. On September 2, 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled in
United States v. Moalin that the NSA’s bulk collection of metadata exceeded the
authorization of Congress and violated section 1861 of the FISA Act. 11
While this decision is a significant step towards curtailing the government’s
ability to collect bulk metadata, it was not the most important part of the opinion. On
appeal, Moalin and his co-defendants challenged the metadata evidence under the
Fourth Amendment, arguing that they were entitled to receive notice of any additional
surveillance that they had been subjected to through a warrant authorized by FISA
Subchapter I.12 The Ninth Circuit developed a new test for notice, stating that, “the
government is required only to inform the defendant that surveillance occurred and
that the government intends to use the information obtained or derived from it [in a
criminal prosecution].”13 If the government does not feel comfortable disclosing the
information for national security reasons, the court can review the information
through ex parte communications or in camera.14 Despite the Ninth Circuit creating
this new notice test, it did not apply it in Moalin because it found that the exclusion of
the metadata would not change the outcome of the case. 15
This notice requirement has never been applied to additional electronic
surveillance derived from a FISA warrant in a criminal prosecution because the
government and FISA court traditionally have given the “derived from” language a
narrow interpretation.16 This new notice requirement may leave the door open for
other circuits to determine that the government must provide notice to the defendant
of any additional electronic surveillance derived from a FISA warrant, not just the
surveillance that the government intends to use in court.17
This note argues that the new notice requirement established by the Ninth
Circuit in Moalin is necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of United
States citizens who are being electronically surveilled by the United States
9 Mattathias Schwartz, The Whole Haystack: The N.S.A. Claims it Needs Access to All Our Phone
Records. But is That the Best Way to Catch a Terrorist?, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 19, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack.
10 In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted] ("2006" Primary Order), No. BR 06-05, slip op. at 2 (F.I.S.C. May 24, 2006), 2,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_May%2024%202006%20Order%20from%20FISC.pd
f.
11 973 F.3d 977, 996 (9th Cir. 2020) (The Ninth Circuit found that the bulk collection of metadata
violated 50 U.S.C. § 1861. This section dictates the requirements the Attorney General must prove in
its application in order to obtain a warrant for electronic surveillance from the FISA court.).
12 Id. at 997-998. (FISA Subchapter I is comprised of 50 U.S.C. § 1801 – 1812.).
13 Id. at 1001.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-for-challenge-to-secretwiretaps.html.
17 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Government. Part II provides an evolution of FISA law and its contention with the
Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement. Part III provides greater detail and
background on United States v. Moalin.18 Part IV analyzes the untested notice
requirement and its implications on the FISA court and other circuits. Part V
concludes that the notice requirement is necessary to ensure United States citizens are
able to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights after being electronically surveilled
by the United States Government.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to analyze Fourth Amendment challenges in FISA related cases, it is
important to first examine how the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement operates
in ordinary jurisprudence. Next, it is important to discuss the evolution of FISA law.
After examining both of these topics, this section will explore how the Fourth
Amendment applies in FISA related cases.
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding Notice
The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures. 19
The Fourth Amendment requires that the person be notified that they are subject to a
search unless there are exigent circumstances. 20 When the Fourth Amendment was
drafted, notice was easy to give and receive because the individual subject to the search
would be able to physically observe officers of the government looking through their
belongings.21 However, when electronic surveillance of any kind is involved, it can work
against the goal of the surveillance and prematurely alert the target of the on-going
investigation. Courts have found that there is no requirement of advance notice in
cases such as wiretapping, where the notice would encourage the target to discontinue
use of that method of communication.22 Under these circumstances, there needs to be
a constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice, such as notification upon
completion of the operation.23

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20 Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
21 Orin Kerr, Did the Ninth Circuit Create a New Fourth Amendment Notice Requirement for
Surveillance Practices?, LAWFARE (Sept. 9, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-ninthcircuit-create-new-fourth-amendment-notice-requirement-surveillance-practices.
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248
(1979).
23 United States v. Donovan 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977).
18
19
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B. The Evolution of FISA Law from 1978 to Present
1. History of FISA
When the FISA court was created in 1978, it was part of a major restructuring
policy that completely changed how the United States conducted electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence.24 Before FISA, wiretaps were authorized for
national security under the President’s Article II powers of the Constitution.25 The
original FISA court created a procedure for the Attorney General to obtain warrants
that authorized the use of electronic surveillance for the purpose of foreign
intelligence.26
A FISA warrant differs from a regular warrant in that in a FISA warrant, the
government must show probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a “foreign
power”27 or an “agent of a foreign power”28 and that there is a connection to the location
that is being surveilled.29 FISA was never meant to survive constitutional standards
required under criminal law because it was created with the purpose of easing
counterintelligence operations on foreign subjects.30
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra note 7, at 13.
Id. (U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. authorizes the President to control foreign relations).
26 Id.
27 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) defines a “foreign power” as:
24
25

a foreign government . . . , a faction of a foreign nation . . . , an entity that is openly
acknowledge by a foreign government(s) to be directed and controlled by such
foreign government(s), a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation thereof, a foreign-based political organization . . . , an entity that is
directed and controlled by a foreign government(s), or an entity not substantially
composed of United States persons that is engaged in the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
28

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) defines an “agent of a foreign power” as:
any person other than a United States person, who acts in the United States as an
officer or employee of a foreign power . . . , acts for or on behalf of a foreign power
which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary
to the interest of the United States . . . or when such person knowingly aids or abets
any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person
to engage in such activities, engages in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore, engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, or activities in preparation thereof, or engages in the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, or activities therfor, for or on behalf of a foreign
power, or knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such proliferation or
activities therfor, or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such
proliferation or activities in preparation therefor.

29 3 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS § 11:2–5 (Thomson Reuters, 2019); 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A); & 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a)(3)(B). (A regular warrant must be based on probable cause and particularly describing the
person, place, or things to be searched. A warrant must be submitted under oath and by a neutral and
detached official.).
30 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 29, § 11.12.
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2. Expansion of FISA Capabilities
In the aftermath of September 11th, President Bush authorized a program that
came to be known as the President’s Surveillance Program, which was reauthorized
every thirty to forty-five days.31 This program authorized the NSA to collect bulk
metadata on certain international communications. 32 This program was authorized as
an emergency response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. 33 In 2004, the
government asked the FISA court to expand its purview to include the President’s
Surveillance Program.34 The bulk collection of metadata was an authorized
government practice under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 215
authorized the government to collect, “‘books, records, papers, documents, and other
items’ that are ‘relevant’ to ‘an authorized investigation’”. 35 However, Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act has since ended, following the recommendation of the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.36
In 2008, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”) which allows the
government to conduct electronic surveillance of people believed to be outside of the
United States without using the procedures required by FISA Subchapter I. 37 Prior to
the passage of the FAA, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, which
prohibited surveillance of United States persons; however, following the passage of the
FAA, Executive Order 12333 continues to allow the incidental collection of metadata
from United States persons. 38
3. Relevant FISA Statutes
The meat of FISA Subchapter I comes from section 1802, which outlines the
ability of the Attorney General to utilize electronic surveillance without a court order.39
Section 1802 explains that the Attorney General may use electronic surveillance
without a court order for up to one year when the electronic surveillance is solely
directed at communications used exclusively among foreign powers and there is no
substantial likelihood that any United States person is a party. 40 The exclusion of
United States persons is a crucial distinction and part of what allows the FISA court
to operate in the manner that it does.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra note 7, at 9.
Id.
33 Id. at 37.
34 Id. at 13.
35 Schwartz, supra note 9.
36 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra note 7, at 168.
37 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 998 (9th Cir. 2020) (If the government wants to use
information that was gathered under the FAA in a criminal prosecution, they have the same notice
requirements as under FISA Subchapter I. However, with the Snowden leaks, it came out that the
government was using information gathered under the FAA for criminal prosecutions without notice.
At this time, the Department of Justice contemplated adding a notice requirement to the FISA Act
but decided not to.). See Savage, supra note 16.
38 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 999; Exec. Ord. No. 12,333; See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 30, § 17:19.
39 50 U.S.C. § 1802.
40 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i); 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
31
32
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While the Moalin41 court created a new notice requirement for FISA, there is
already an existing notice requirement. Section 1806 states that:
Whenever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise
use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before
any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person42, any
information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that
aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the
Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at
a reasonable time prior to an effort to so disclose or so use that
information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and
the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed
or used that the Government intends to so disclose or so use such
information.43
This notice requirement, unlike the one applied in Moalin44, is only necessary
if there was a warrantless collection of information.45
Furthermore, section 1806(e) includes a remedy for aggrieved persons who
wish to challenge the entry of information. Under section 1806(e), the defendant has
the ability to file a motion to suppress only if, “(1) the information was unlawfully
acquired; or (2) the surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of
authorization or approval.”46 The motion also, “shall be made before the trial, hearing,
or other proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such a motion or the
person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.”47 While the motion to suppress is
an available remedy, there are strict restrictions that can make its use difficult.
C. How the Fourth Amendment is Currently Applied in FISA Cases
United States v. Cavanagh48 ruled that while the FISA court gets to use a less
stringent standard for electronic surveillance, it still needs to comply with the Fourth
Amendment.49 While the Cavanagh court did not discuss whether there was a notice
requirement under the Fourth Amendment related to FISA, the court did confirm that
the FISA warrant is only authorized for foreign intelligence.50 The Moalin court used
this confirmation to determine that if the FISA court only has purview over foreign
Moalin, 973 F.3d at 1001.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (“An ‘aggrieved person’ means a person who is the target of an electronic
surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to electronic
surveillance”).
43 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
44 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 977.
45 Savage, supra note 16.
46 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(1)-(2).
47 Id.
48 United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 788.
41
42
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intelligence, then it cannot use the information gleaned from electronic surveillance
for criminal prosecution.51 The court then determined that this leaves the Fourth
Amendment notice requirement intact and requires the government to provide notice
to criminal defendants when their information has been obtained through electronic
surveillance so that the defendant has adequate time to file a motion to suppress. 52
In United States v. Mohamud,53 the court discussed the notice requirement
under the Fourth Amendment with regard to the FISA court’s electronic surveillance. 54
In this case, the defendant was notified of the electronic surveillance after the verdict
when the government filed a supplemental notice. 55 The government used electronic
surveillance to look at Mohamud’s emails, which became the basis for the FISA
warrant.56 The defendant argued that the late admission of notice mandated
suppression of the evidence.57 The court found that suppression of the evidence was
not warranted in this situation because the defendant was not prejudiced by the late
notice as the government never actually used the emails in court. 58 The court refused
to evaluate the possible Fourth Amendment violation of the emails without a showing
that the defendant suffered an injury as a result of the omission. 59 This case is a clear
example of how narrow the notice requirement is interpreted and how difficult it can
be to satisfy under the FISA requirements.
III. THE CASE
United States v. Moalin60 concerns the appeal of four defendants who are
members of the Somali diaspora that were convicted of sending $10,900 USD to the
foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”), al-Shabaab. 61 Somalia has been in a civil war
since 1991 after the military dictator, Siad Barre, was ousted.62 An interim government
was set up in 2004, but faced a great deal of distrust and opposition.63 To protect
themselves against the interim government and the Ethiopians, a number of

United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 1000 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id.
53 843 F. 3d 420, 431 (9th Cir. 2016).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 438.
57 Id. at 436.
58 United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 437-438 (9th Cir. 2016).
59 Id. at 438 n.21. See United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989).
60 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 1000 (9th Cir.2020).
61 Id. at 984-985.
62 Id. at 985 (In addition to the civil war, there has been widespread famine, drought, and violence
where tens of thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Around
three million Somalis fled, creating the Somali diaspora).
63 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 985.
51
52
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insurgency groups have emerged, one of which is al-Shabaab. 64 The United States
designated al-Shabaab as a FTO in 2008.65
At the time of this appeal, defendants Basaaly Saeed Moalin and Issa Doreh
were citizens of the United States, defendant Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud had
refugee status in the United States, and defendant Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud had
a visa.66 All of the defendants immigrated to the United States a number of years ago
from Somalia and lived in Southern California. 67 All of the defendants were charged
with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, 68 conspiracy to provide
material support to a FTO69, and conspiracy70 to launder monetary instruments. 71
Defendants Moalin, M. Mohamud and Doreh were charged with added count72 of
providing material support to an FTO.73 Defendant Moalin received an additional
charge74 of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. 75
The government had obtained a FISA warrant under Subchapter I to have
access to Moalin’s calls.76 During the time of surveillance, Moalin was calling a man
who went by the name of “Shikhalow,” aka “Ayrow,” that the government believed was
a key leader in al-Shabaab.77 For over a year, Moalin and the other defendants kept in
contact with Shikhalow and sent money through their local hawala 78 to Shikhalow.79
Defendants argued that Shikhalow was not Ayrow and that the money was going back
to Somalia for humanitarian purposes.80

64 Id. (al-Shabaab is known for using improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings.); see
also Press Release, Department of State, Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of al-Shabaab
(July 19, 2018) (on file with author), https://www.state.gov/amendments-to-the-terrorist-designationsof-al-shabaab/. Pertinent language of the press release states the following:

Since al-Shabaab’s initial 2008 FTO designation, it has killed numerous civilians
throughout East Africa. Al Shabaab’s attacks included the October 2017 attack in
Mogadishu where the group detonated a truck bomb that killed over 500 people,
the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Kenya that killed more than 70 people,
and the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda that took place during the
World Cup and killed 76 people, including one U.S. citizen.
United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 985 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 985 n. 2.
67 Id. at 985.
68 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
69 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
70 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) & (h).
71 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 985-986 (9th Cir. 2020).
72 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)-(2).
73 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 985-986.
74 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
75 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 986.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Schwartz, supra note 9 (A “hawala” is an informal network of Islamic money-transfer agents.
The hawala that Moalin and the other defendants were going to was called Shidaal Express, where
Issa Doreh worked.); United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 985-986 (9th Cir. 2020) (The hawala is
necessary to send money to Somalia because Somalia has no formal banking system and operates
mainly through the use of these hawalas.).
79 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 986 (9th Cir. 2020).
80 Id. at 987.
65
66
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Before the trial began, Moalin filed a motion to suppress all electronic
surveillance made under FISA and the fruits of that surveillance because Moalin
argued that the information obtained under FISA had been obtained illegally, violating
the Fourth Amendment.81 The district court denied the motion, and further denied
Moalin’s counsel access to the FISA documents. 82 Two days before the trial began, the
government introduced an email from a redacted Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) linguist that suggested there were other agencies monitoring Moalin. 83 After
the trial had commenced, the defendant learned about the NSA’s bulk metadata
collection through the Snowden disclosures.84 Moalin further learned that public
officials had used the bulk metadata collection program to open investigations into
Moalin personally.85 The defendants then filed a motion for a new trial, which was
denied.86
In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the bulk collection of metadata by
the NSA exceeded the scope of the authorization Congress granted FISA. 87 The Ninth
Circuit also ruled that the government is required to notify the defendant that
electronic surveillance occurred and the government intends to use information
obtained or derived from it at trial.88 This case created a new test for the Fourth
Amendment notice requirement under the FISA act and will likely change the way
FISA cases are heard. However, the Ninth Circuit did not apply this test to Moalin’s
case, finding that the defendants had not been prejudiced by the lack of notice. 89

Id.
Id.
83 Id. (The email said: “We just heard from another agency that Ayrow tried to make a call to
Basaaly [Moalin] today, but the call didn’t go through. If you see anything today, can you give us a
shout? We’re extremely interested in getting real-time info (location/new #’s) on Ayrow.”).
84 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2020) (The government’s disclosure of the
bulk metadata used Moalin as an example that bulk collection helped stop terrorist attacks);
Schwartz, supra note 9.
85 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 987 (“These statements reported that the FBI had previously closed an
investigation focused on Moalin without bringing charges, then reopened that investigation based on
information obtained from the metadata program.”); Schwartz, supra note 9 (“The government has
not shown any instance besides Moalin’s in which the law’s metadata provision has directly led to a
conviction in a terrorism case.”).
86 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 988.
87 Id. at 996.
88 Id. at 1001.
89 Id.
81
82
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. New Notice Requirement Under United States v. Moalin
1. How the New Notice Requirement Arose
On its surface, the new notice requirement in United States v. Moalin90 can be
difficult to distinguish from that already existing in FISA subchapter I. 91 FISA
subchapter I requires that the government shall notify the aggrieved party and the
district court prior to the start of trial of any information that it intends to use in court
and disclose any information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance
conducted under FISA authorization.92
In this case, the government failed to notify defendant Moalin that it had
collected his metadata through the NSA’s bulk metadata collection program.93
However, when the government submitted a redacted email from the FBI to the
defendants two days before the commencement of trial, it became clear that the FISA
authorized surveillance was being used by other agencies for other purposes. 94 This is
an issue because depending on the type of electronic surveillance, when it occurred,
and how it was authorized, it is possible that the FBI surveillance was used as evidence
in the original FISA wiretap applications.95 The use of electronic surveillance obtained
under a FISA warrant as evidence in domestic criminal proceedings represents a huge
problem for agencies who perform both foreign intelligence surveillance and
participate primarily in domestic law enforcement, where there is supposed to be a sort
of ‘Chinese wall’96 between the two.97
This issue was further exposed by the Snowden disclosures. Edward Snowden
explained that the government was collecting bulk metadata through FISA
authorization and then turning around and using that same metadata in criminal
prosecutions without notifying the defendants of the surveillance. 98 This alerted the
defendants in this case that their metadata was likely being used for additional
surveillance, which is when they went to the Ninth Circuit to request the additional
surveillance that was not available during their first trial.99 The defendants argued
973 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
92 Id. See also United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 998 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he government
notified them and the district court that it intended to ‘use or disclose’ in ‘proceedings in this case
information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the authority of
[FISA].’”) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)).
93 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 998.
94 Id. at 987.
95 Id.
96 Ethical Wall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (A Chinese Wall, also called an Ethical
Wall is, “a screening mechanism maintained by an organization . . . to protect client confidences from
improper disclosure to lawyers or staff who are not involved in a particular representation.”).
97 See Schwartz, supra note 9.
98 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 998 (9th Cir. 2020). See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra
note 7, at 1.
99 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 998.
90
91
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that they had a Fourth Amendment100 right to be notified of the additional
surveillance, other than the surveillance authorized under FISA subchapter I because
notice is a critical part of the Fourth Amendment.101
The defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument seems like the logical approach
to this situation because in any other criminal prosecution, the government would be
required to give the defendant notice if a search had occurred.102 However, in one of
the only other instances where the Ninth Circuit decided a Fourth Amendment case
involving FISA, the Ninth Circuit held that while the Fourth Amendment is not
directly applied, “a [d]ifferent standard[] [of probable cause] may be compatible with
the Fourth Amendment if [it is] reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.” 103
2. The New Notice Requirement
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants in part, stating that, “the
government is required only to inform the defendant that the surveillance occurred
and that the government intends to use information obtained or derived from it.”104
This creates a whole new area of notice where the government will now be required
not only to give notice of information gathered by the FISA authorized warrant that
they wish to use in court, but also any other information derived from the original
surveillance that they plan to use as well. 105
Traditionally under the Fourth Amendment, if the government fails to notify
the defendant that a search has occurred, the defendant would be able to file a motion
to suppress in order to keep the unlawfully gathered evidence out of trial. 106 However,
under FISA, a motion to suppress the evidence of electronic surveillance is only
available if the evidence was “unlawfully acquired” or the evidence was not “in
conformity with the authorization or approval.”107 This section is essentially useless
100

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendments states the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

Moalin, 973 F.3d at 1000.
Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967); Moalin, 973 F.3d at 999; Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967).
103 United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 2020).
104 Moalin, 973 F.3d at 1001 (emphasis added).
105 Id.; see Kerr, supra note 21. In opinion about the notice rule, Kerr states:
101
102

This notice rule seems pretty different. This is a notice rule that is all about making
the exclusionary rule meaningful. You don’t get notice unless you are criminally
charged, and the notice you get is designed to alert you that you might have a
plausible motion to suppress that you should look into and consider filing.
106
107

Moalin, 973 F.3d at 1000. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 52-53.
50 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(1)-(2). The pertinent language of the statutory provision states:
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because often times, there is virtually no way for a defendant or defendant’s attorney
to gain access to the original FISA court issued warrant to ascertain whether it was
unlawfully acquired or made in conformity with the warrant’s authorization. 108
Furthermore, prior to the new notice requirement from United States v. Moalin109, the
FISA court and the government read the “derived from”110 requirement narrowly.111
The Ninth Circuit in Moalin essentially widened this interpretation, making it a
requirement that the government notify defendants even when the information they
are using in court is merely derived from information authorized under a FISA
warrant.112
After the government has given the defendant notice that the surveillance and
any information derived from it will be used in court, the Ninth Circuit allows the
defendant to file a motion challenging the evidence and its admission into court.113
However, there is no telling how this new notice requirement will work in reality, as
the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the test to Moalin’s case, finding that the lack of
notice did not prejudice the defendants.114

Any person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an electronic
surveillance to which he is an aggrieved person is to be, or has been, introduced or
otherwise used or disclosed in any trial . . . in or before any court . . . may move to
suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic surveillance on the
grounds that (1) the information was unlawfully acquired; or (2) the surveillance
was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval. Such a
motion shall be made before the trial . . . unless there was no opportunity to make
such a motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion.
Savage, supra note 16. Savage explains the what limited information regarding surveillance
evidence prosecutors are required to provide:
108

In national security cases involving orders issued under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, or FISA, prosecutors alert defendants only that some
evidence derives from a FISA wiretap, but not the details like whether there had
just been one order or a chain of several. Only the judges see those details.
973 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2020).
50 U.S.C. § 1806(d).
111 Savage, supra note 16. Savage discusses an instance of where the narrow interpretation of the
“derived from” language was invoked:
109
110

The national security lawyers explained that [the failure to notify defendants that
the evidence in their case stemmed from wiretap conversation without a warrant]
was a misunderstanding, the officials said. Because the rules on wiretapping
warrants in foreign intelligence cases are different from the rules in ordinary
criminal investigations, they said, the division has long used a narrow
understanding of what ‘derived from’ means in terms of when it must disclose
specifics to defendants.
United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id.
114 Id.
112
113
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B. The Impact of the New Notice Requirement on Future Cases
1. Will the Decision Be Accepted?
While the Ninth Circuit refused to apply their own test in United States v.
Moalin,115 it is unclear how the Ninth Circuit, or other courts for that matter, will
apply this new notice requirement in future cases, if they choose to use apply it at all.
Of the appellate circuits, the Ninth Circuit is known for putting out controversial
opinions that often times get reversed or vacated by the Supreme Court. 116
2. Moalin Follows the Current Trend of Privacy Concerns with FISA
Regardless of the fact that this case came out of the Ninth Circuit, it is sure to
have a lasting impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it follows the general
feeling of a nation nineteen years following September 11th. Following the Snowden
disclosures, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board recommended that the
practice of bulk collection of metadata should be terminated 117 and the government
should implement heightened privacy protocols to reduce the effects of the bulk
collection of metadata collection.118
Id.
Linda Que, Does the Ninth Circuit Have the Highest Reversal Rate in the Country?, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/us/politics/fact-check-trump-ninth-circuit.html.
The author discusses the reversal and vacating rate of Ninth Circuit decisions that are appealed to
the Supreme Court:
115
116

From 2006 to 2015, the Supreme Court heard 160 cases from the Ninth Circuit,
reversing 106 decisions and vacating 24 . . . [t]hat is a reversal or vacating rate of
about 81 percent, which is higher than the average reversal rate of nearly 73
percent . . . . In the 2016 term, the Ninth Circuit’s rate was nearly 88 percent, still
behind the 100 percent reversal or vacating rates of four other circuit courts.
117 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra note 7, at 16-17. The Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board argued the following about the veracity of Section 215:

The Section 215 bulk telephone records program lacks a viable legal foundation
under Section 215, implicates constitutional concerns under the First and Fourth
Amendments, raises serious threated to privacy and civil liberties as a policy
matter, and has shown only limited value. As a result, the Board recommends that
the government end the program.
118

Id. at 17. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board report further states that:
The recommend[ed] changes can be implemented without any need for
congressional or FISC authorization. Specifically the government should: (a) reduce
the retention period for the bulk telephone records program from five to three years;
(b) reduce the number of “hops” used in contact chaining from three to two; (c)
submit the NSA’s ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ determinations to the FISC for
review after they have been approved by NSA and used to query the database; and
(d) require a ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ determination before analysts may
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Furthermore, the Attorney General and the FBI have been advocating for
reforms to the FISA court.119 While the reforms will be focused on the FBI’s
investigation of elected officials, Attorney General Barr said that,
FISA is a critical tool to ensuring the safety and security of Americans,
particularly when it comes to fighting terrorism. However, the
American people must have confidence that the United States
Government will exercise its surveillance authorities in a manner that
protects the civil liberties of Americans, . . . and complies with the
Constitution and law of the United States. 120
In the many years following September 11th, Americans are looking to regain
some of the privacy rights they gave up in order to fight terrorism. 121 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Moalin is a huge step for privacy reform in the
realm of national security, not only for the addition of the notice requirement, but also
for holding that the bulk metadata collection program exceeded the scope of FISA. 122

submit queries to, or otherwise analyze, the ‘corporate store,’ which contains the
results of contact chaining queries to the full ‘collection store.
119 Press Release, Department of Justice, The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Announce Critical Reforms to Enhance Compliance, Oversight, and Accountability at
the FBI (Sept. 1, 2020) (On file with author), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-andfederal-bureau-investigation-announce-critical-reforms-enhance. FBI Director Christopher Wray
explained:

That’s why I immediately ordered more than 40 corrective actions, including
foundational FISA reforms, many of which went beyond those recommended by the
Inspector General. The FBI has been working diligently to implement these
corrective actions. The additional reforms announced today, which we worked on
closely with the Attorney General’s office, will build on the FBI’s efforts to bolster
its compliance program. FISA is an indispensable tool that the FBI uses to protect
our country from national security threats, and Americans can rest assured that
the FBI remains dedicated to continuously strengthening our FISA compliance
efforts and ensuring that our FISA authorities are exercised in a responsible
manner.
Id.
Shiva Manium, Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americansfeel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-security-concerns/ (“In an early 2015 online survey, 52% of
Americans described themselves as ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about government
surveillance of American’s data and electronic communications, compared with 46% who described
themselves as ‘not very concerned’ or ‘not at all concerned’ about the surveillance.”); see also Public
Opinion on Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
(last updated May 2020).
122 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 996 (9th Cir. 2020).
120
121
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3. Issues with the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Moalin
There are a few issues with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Moalin that
could cause the decision to be interpreted in a way that the new notice requirement is
less restrictive than mentioned above. The first being the actual access the defendants
and the defendant’s attorneys will have to surveillance evidence. Even if the
government gives the defendant some sort of notice, the defendant will not necessarily
get direct access to the information that the government possesses. 123 The government
is able to keep this information from the defendants because of our country’s concern
for national security, especially with regard for foreign intelligence.124 If the
government believes the information to have national security implications, it can
present the information to the court through an ex parte or in camera hearing,
excluding the defendants.125
The second issue is that the government is only required to notify the
defendant of the surveillance if they plan to use the surveillance or any other
information derived from it.126 This was part of the problem in United States v.
Mohamud,127 where the defendant argued that he had a Fourth Amendment right to
view the emails the government alleged were part of his contact with a foreign
national.128 The issue that the defendant encountered in this case is that the emails
were only used to get the FISA warrant in the first place and were never introduced at
trial; thus, the government was not required to notify the defendant of its use of
them.129 The worry is that the government will continue to read their obligations
narrowly until the Supreme Court or a number of other circuits come to the same
conclusion that the Ninth Circuit did.
The third issue with this opinion is that the new notice requirement only
applies to notice, not disclosure.130 This is a problem because there will not necessarily
be a difference in outcome if the defendant is notified that the surveillance occurred,
but is never given full access to that information. While the new notice requirement
allows for defendants to get more access to information surrounding their case, the
Ninth Circuit’s inability to extend notice to disclosure leaves a valuable gap in
information which leaves the established power imbalance in place.131 There will
always be an imbalance in power in favor of the government in national security cases,
but the new notice requirement established by Moalin provides defendants some
evidentiary tools to help tip the scales.
Despite these issues, the Moalin opinion is sure to change the way defendants
interact with the FISA courts. This opinion has even more weight as it is championed
Id. at 1001.
Id.
125 Id. (“See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f), allowing in camera, ex parte review of the legality of
electronic surveillance under FISA Subchapter I if ‘the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath
that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States.’”).
126 Id.
127 843 F.3d 420, 438 (9th Cir. 2016).
128 Id.
129 Id. (This case is similar to Moalin in many ways. The defendant was also born in Somalia and
living in Southern California. The Ninth Circuit decided this case in 2016, just four years before the
same circuit decided Moalin.).
130 United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
131 Id.
123
124
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as the only instance where bulk metadata collection was able to catch a terrorist. 132
While the practice of collecting bulk metadata has been heavily scrutinized, it is
important for the United States Government to make it seem like it was a worthwhile
program at the time of its use. Moalin exposes how the FISA courts and the NSA have
exploited defendants with any connection to foreign nationals whose actions can be
interpreted in any way as suspicious.
V. CONCLUSION
Nineteen years following the September 11th terrorist attacks, Americans are
looking to regain some of the privacy rights they exchanged for protection from foreign
adversaries. While the new notice requirement derived from United States v. Moalin133
removes one brick from the wall the United States Government built against foreign
threats, it returns Fourth Amendment notice protections to those facing criminal
prosecution in the United States.134
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Moalin determined that the United
States Government must provide notice to defendants in criminal prosecutions when
the government intends to introduce evidence obtained or derived from electronic
surveillance authorized by the FISA Court. 135 This new notice requirement goes even
further to add that once the defendant is notified, they are able to file a motion to
challenge the legality of the introduction of the electronic surveillance. 136
This new notice requirement is a step in the right direction for defendants in
criminal prosecutions who have been electronically surveilled through a FISA
authorized warrant. However, there is great uncertainty in how this rule will be
applied, as it was not applied in Moalin,137 or even if it will be applied at all.138 There
is hope that this decision will be followed by other circuits because it reflects
Americans’ desire to move away from electronic surveillance, particularly the bulk
collection of telephony metadata.139
The biggest obstacle affecting the utility of the new notice requirement is the
importance of protecting the ever expanding definition of national security and its
Schwartz, supra note 9.
973 F.3d 977, 1001 (9th Cir. 2020).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 1001. The court stated:
132
133

Based on our careful review of the classified record, we are satisfied that any lack
of notice, assuming such notice was required, did not prejudice the defendants. Our
review confirms that on the particular facts of this case, information as to whether
surveillance other than the metadata collection occurred would not have enabled
defendants to assert a successful Fourth Amendment claim. We therefore decline
to decide whether additional notice was required.
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply its own test or even walk through the analysis of why it chose not
to so this leaves the new notice requirement open to interpretation for other courts.
138 See Que, supra note 116.
139 See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, supra note 7 at 16-17.
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information, methods, and sources. The emphasis on national security in the United
States makes the information in the FISA court almost impossible to reach. This new
notice requirement will be a crucial step in the national conversation regarding the
contention between privacy, national security, and the Fourth Amendment. Other
circuits should adopt the test set forth in United States v. Moalin and work to restore
the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.

